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Natural Resources Litigation:
A Dialogue on Discovery Abuse
and the New Federal Rules

In January, 1993, Colorado Supreme Court Justice George Lohr and Denver
Attorney Nancy Gegenheimer participated in the Natural Resources Law Center's Hot
Topics in Natural Resources program entitled "Ethical Considerations in Discovery." ·
The following two essays, edited by NRLC Senior Staff Attorney. Teresa Rice, grew out
of the authors' contribution to the program.
Justice Lohr discusses prevailing discovery abuses and the related rise in the cost
of litigation, and considers proposals for reform. Since our January program, the
Supreme Coun adopted one of these proposals, amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Nancy Gegenheimer (seep. 8) describes these amendments and assesses
whether they are likely to ameliorate the abuses described by Justice Lob~.

Ethical Considerations in Discovery
George E. Lohr1
As viewed from an appellate bench, the evidence is persuasive that discovery
abuse is common and is contributing to the more general problem of rising costs of
litigation. This has given rise to a variety of reforms and proposals for reform, ranging
from fine tuning to fundamental changes. It behooves both the legal profession and the
judiciary to evaluate the seriousness of the problem and to ask ourselves what can and
should be done to address it without losing the benefits that liberal discovery has. to
offer.
The original concept was excellent. Notice pleading woul_d result in crisp, taut
pleadings. Information necessary for trial would then be developed through the various
discovery devices of interrogatories, depositions, and requests for production of
documents. With the benefit of full information, parties could realistically assess the
strength of their positions, thereby promoting settlement. In appropriate cases, discovery
could posture a case for complete or partial summary judgment. If settlement or
summary judgment could not be achieved, all parties would go to trial fully prepared,
with areas of factual dispute developed and no surprises to be encountered. The ·
overarching goal of just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of every legal action could
thereby be achieved. [Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947); Hawkins v.

District Court, 638 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Colo. 1982).J
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In order to promote the goal of conducting litigation with the benefit of full
information, discovery was allowed a broad scope. Under Rule 26(b), parties could
discover not only matter relevant to the claims and defenses developed by the pleadings,
but any unprivileged matter relevant to the subject matter of the action. [Fed.R.Civ.P.
26(b)(l),· Colo.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(J).] Inadmissibility at trial was not ground for objection so
long as the information sought appeared reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. The broad standards of the rules have been reinforced by judicial
decisions emphasizing that the rules should be liberally construed to effectuate their
truth seeking purpose. [E.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 430, 351
(1978); Kerivin v. District Court, 649 P.2d 1086, 1088 (Colo. 1982).] In close cases the
balance tips in favor of discovery. Litigants seeking protective orders must bear the
burden· of showing good cause for the protection sought. [Cameron v. District Court, 193
Colo. 286, 290, 565 P.2d 925, 927-28 (1977).]
With competent and ethically sensitive counsel on both sides, and especially when
the partie_s' economic circumstances are in parity, discovery appears to work much as it
was intended. Unfortunately, the same tools· that function well for their intended
purpose are fraught with opportunity for abuse.
Abuse should not come as a surprise. After all, by the time a case has been filed
the parties are often divided and hostile. The parties, and often their counsel, see the
issues in black and white terms; positions are polarized. Parties expect their counsel to
be aggressive and to advance their interests with force and tenacity. Counsel have
additional pressures. In complex cases there is a fear that a critical fact will remain
undiscovered, with the prospect of a case unnecessarily lost, a client exceedingly
unhappy, and a malpractice claim to follow.
In this environment, the tools of discovery invite misuse and present the
opportunity for abuse. The forms that such abuse can take are familiar:
-· discovery much more extensive than necessary for the litigation at hand, taking into
account the amount in controversy;
- interrogatories not adapted to the informational needs in the particular litigation but
pulled from some other litigation file and employed without modification;
- delay in responding to interrogatories, necessitating motions to compel;
- objections to interrogatories raised to create delay rather than to contain discovery
within proper scope;
- evasive and nonresponsive answers, creating the need for motions to compel;

2

- multiple depositions when a smaller number from persons truly central to the dispute
would be adequate;
- abusive examination in the course of depositions;
- unwarranted instructions to the deponent not to answer questions;
- responses to·requests for production of documents organized to maximize the
possibility that damaging information will be overlooked; and
- assertions of privilege that ultimately cannot be ;upported.
The list could go on. Completely off the scale is conduct going beyond abuse, such as
suppression or destruction of documents. [See generally, Robert E. Sarazen, An Ethical
Approach to Discovery Abuse, 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 459 (1990); William H. ReMine, III,
James L. Gilbert, Discovery--Abuses, Sanctions, and Ethical Concerns, 23 Trial 53 (Jan

1987); Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Refonn, 3 Rev. Litigation 1 (1982) (summary
of the proceedings of the 1982 National Conference on Discovery Refonn).]
'
Multiple motives underlie abuse. In addition to those already mentioned, abuse is
particularly inviting when one party has greater economic strength or otherwise has
greater staying power than another, for a party may then be induced to settle in order to
contain mounting litigation costs. Abusive discovery may be attractive to satisfy an
aggressive client who wishes to make things difficult for the other side. Obstructive
·tactics may be employed to shield damaging information. Some have suggested that
lawyers on occasion engage in excessive discovery in order to increase their own fees,
especially in difficult economic times.
With such strong and numerous forces impelling abusive discovery practices, how
can the problem be addressed? Initially, except for egregious cases, there is the
considerable problem of identifying abuse in a particular case. Is a lawyer engaging in
excessive discovery or simply being scrupulously careful to ensure that relevant.
information is fully developed? Is the lawyer indulging iri delaying tactics or simply
trying to protect sensitive, confidential information? Are we seeing harassment, or is it
persistence in the face of grudging disclosure? Is this delay or simply an effort to obtain
reasonable time to respond? Certainly, there are cases where abuse is clear. In many
others, however, assessment of the propriety of the conduct may·involve a value
judgment about which reasonable persons could differ.
Addressing.discovery abuse in particular cases at present requires patient resort to
a rather extensive array of procedures and remedies available under the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Protective orders can be sought to shield privileged material or material
outside the bounds of proper discovery, and to protect.against oppression or undue
burden or expense under Rule 26(c). Orders compelling discovery can be sought under
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Rule 37. The certifications required of attorneys filing discovery requests--by Federal
Rules 11 and 26(g) and by Colorado Rules 11 and 16--provide additional springboards
for the imposition of such sa~ctions. Where such certifications apply, an attorney's
signature to a document constitutes a certification that the document "is not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation." [Fed.R.Civ.P. 11; Colo.R.Civ.P. 11.] A violation
empowers a court, upon its own initiative or upon motion, to impose a sanction whlch
may include reasonable expenses, including a reasonable attorney fee incurred because
of the filing of the document. The sanction may be imposed upon the attorney, the
client, or both. [See, e.g., ChapmOJt & Cole v. !tel Container Jnt'l B.V., 865 F.2d 676, 680,
685-86 (5th Cir. 1989).] These rules provide a basis for discouraging some forms of
discovery abuse by visiting the resultant costs upon the abuser.
Overlapping Rule 11 in discovery matters is Federal Rule 26(g), adopted in 1983,
which has no analog in the Colorado rules. This rule provides that every request for
discovery or objection made by a party represented by an attorney is to be signed by the
attorney and that such signature constitutes a certification that, among other matters, the
request or objection is "not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation" and is "not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already bad in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation." [Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(g).] If a certification is made in
violation of the Rule, the court shall, upon motion or upon its own initiative impose a
sanction on the attorney, the party, or both, which may include an order to pay the ·
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including reasonable attorney's
fees. [See In re Byrd, Inc., 927 F.2d 1135 (lOth Cir. 1991).]
Another arrow in the quiver of discovery abuse remedies available in federal
court is the rule providing that an attorney who "so multiplies the proceedings in any
case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct."
[See 28 U.S. C. Sec. 1927 (1988); Roberts v. Lyons, 131 F.RD. 75, 77, 78 (E.D.' Pa. 1990).]
Rule 26(f) of the federal rules provides for a discovery conference on motion of a
party or the court's own motion. This rule provides a device for identifying discovery
issues, establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limits on discovery, and the
like. The parties are required to participate in good faith in framing a discovery plan,
· and sanctions in the form of reasonable expenses including attorney's fees are available
under Rule 37 for failure to participate in good faith in forming a plan.
In Colorado; Rule 16 provides for filing a disclosure certificate 180 days in
advance of trial. The certificate must be signed in conformance with Rule 11. One of
the features of such a certificate is a discovery plan specifying the type of discovery, the
tirrie frame and from whom discovery will be sought Rule 16 also provides for optional
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status conferences and case management orders and requires all discovery to be
completed 30 days before trial. Scheduling procedures are also available under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the local rules of the federal district court.
Rule 37 of both the federal and state rules provides detailed remedies and
sanctions for various forms of failure to make discovery. These include reasonable
expenses, including costs and attorney's fees. A court's obligation to impose such
financial sanctions in most circumstances, however, is tempered by the court's discretion
to decline imposition of such sanctions if failure to provide discovery was substantially
justified or if other circumstances make such monetary sanctions unjust.
Remedies under the Rules of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding their number and
breadth, do not provide a complete or satisfactory answer to discovery abuse. To'pursue
them is time consuming and costly, with no assurance that the costs will ultimately be
imposed on the opposition. Driving up the costs of litigation is itself a subject of great
public concern. Many judges lack enthusiasm for consideration of discovery motions, and
it may be difficult to obtain hearings or to obtain full and patient consideration when
hearings are set. Judges are often reluctant to impose sanctions and to attribute
improper motives to the alleged abuser of the discovery process. Trial judges also
perceive a similar reluctance on the appellate bench and have little confidence that
discovery sanctions, if imposed, will be upheld on appeal.
Not surprisingly, lack of satisfaction with remedies under the rules as an antidote
to discovery abuse has generated proposals for other solutions. Some suggestions for
improvement come readily to mind. As a modest proposal, our state Rules of Civil
Procedure could be amended to adopt some of the federal rules providing a broader
foundation for imposition of sanctions. In state courts Rule 26.1, providing a system of
abbreviated discovery, could be employed either at the instance of the parties or on
invocation by the court to limit discovery in appropriate cases. In the time since the rule
has been in effect, however, anecdotal information indicates that it has not been used to
any significant extent. The Colorado rules in this regard are currently under study by the
Civil Rules Committee 'of the Colorado Bar Association and the Denver Bar Association
Committee on Professionalism.
A new development in Colorado also bears mention. New rules of professional
conduct were effective January 1, 1993. They contain for the first time a specific
requirement about the conduct of discovery. Rule 3.4(d) provides: "A lawyer shall not: .
. . (d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to make a
reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an
opposing party." More generally, Rule 3.2 provides: "A lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." The extent. to
which these rules will be utilized in attorney discipline cases remains to be seen.
Actively enforced, they could be effective tools in controlling discovery· abuse. Employed
in doubtful situations, they could have a c~lling effect on legitimate discovery efforts.
5

The extent of discontent with discovery abuse has reached such proportions as to
give rise to suggestions for reforms of a more far-reaching nature. For instance, Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
gone so far as to recommend the elimination of notice pleading, the return to fact '
pleading to formulate the factual and legal issues, and a highly structured discovery
process controUed by the court, with discovery costs to be imposed on the losing parties.

[Frank H Easterbrook, Comment, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U.L Rev. 635, 643-47 (1989).]
On th'e nearer horizon, a different approach to modification of discovery
procedures bas been fermenting in the federal system and bas resulted in a proposed
revision of Federal Rules 26, 29, and 30, all recently approved by the judicial conference
of the United States and forwarded to the United States Supreme Court for
consideration. If the Supreme Court adopts them and Congress does not reject them,
the rule changes could be effective as early as December 1, 1993. [Editor's note: These
changes were adopted by the Supreme Court Apri/22, 1993; see the following article by

Nancy Gegenheimer.]
In place of traditional discovery the proposed revisions would require parties,
without request, to disclose four categories of information early in the litigation and to
update these disclosures as the litigation progresses. The first category includes
identification of persons likely to have information bearing significantly on any claim or
defense and identifying the subjects of this information, copies of descriptions of
· documents likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense, a computation of damages
claimed and the materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered. The
second category consists of information concerning expert witnesses, to be furnished at
least 90 days before trial unless the court otherwise orders. The third consists of
identification of witnesses and exhibits, to be disclosed at least 30 days before trial unless
the court otherwise directs. Finally, insurance information must be disclosed.
Although the proposed rule changes would partially take the place of traditional
discovery, they recognize a continuing role for conventional discovery devices and
proce~ures. Conventional devices may be employed to obtain additional information,
and the permissible subject matter scope is broad, as in the present rules. The court has
jurisdiction, however, to limit or curtail discovery consistent with the needs in a
particular case. Additionally, a certificate that a moving party has attempted to confer
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve a discovery dispute is a condition
precedent to· obtaining protective orders under Rule 26(c). Finally, Rule 30 would be
revised to set presumptive limits on the number and length of depositions. The
proposed rule changes are detailed and complex and the foregoing list of some of the
salient features of those revisions is only illustrative of the breadth of the proposed
changes. [Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules Aug. 1991; Committee on Rules of Practice

and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States; Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, 137 F,R.D.
53, 66-68, 87-106.]
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Not all of the initial reaction to the proposed changes to the federal rules has
been sanguine about their beneficial effects if adopted. One article suggests that
uncertainty about what must be disclosed "all but guarantees the same kind (if not more)
of the motion practice that now permeates our oldfangled discovery system." [Loren
Kieve, Discovery Refonn, 77 A.B.A.J. 79 (Dec. 1991).] More hyperbolically, the author
suggests that the proposed changes, far from being a lifeline for a system drowning in
discovery, is more like taking a drowning victim· out of one river and throwing the victim
into another. [Id. at 79.] The author proposes instead the elimination of discovery, an
approach said to be that of both the English courts and civil law. [ld. at 81.)
What then can we conclude from all this? The extent of the critical comment and
the fundamental nature of some of the proposed reforms suggest a widespread
perception that discovery abuse is real and must be addressed in some manner if
litigation is to be conducted in as cost-efficient manner as its intrinsic nature will permit.
This climate ·of criticism creates the potential for wide-sweeping reforms, the most
comprehensive of which arguably would throw out the baby with the bath water. After
all, we can hardly quarrel with the admirable purpose of liberal discovery as set forth in
Hickman v. Taylor, and trials conducted by fully informed adversaries should certainly
produce fairer results than trial by ambush. Fairness has its price, however, and as that
price becomes higher and affects more and more litigants·, we can expect pressure for
varying degrees of change.
What then is the answer to the problem? I have no instant or overarching
solution to offer, nor do I think it admits of one.- Rule changes, however well
intentioned and carefully devised, I submit, are unlikely to be completely effective to
control the. conduct of persons who wish to abuse the procedure or succumb to pressure
to do so. I have no better suggestion to offer than a strong dose of professionalism for
both lawyers and judges. Lawyers must renew their commitment to ethical discovery and
resist the pressures and temptations for abuse. Judges must take discovery matters
seriously and overcome their aversion to discovery disputes and case management
matters. Only if the fact and perception of the prevalence of abusive discovery are
changed can we pres~rve the benefits for which our present system of liberal pretrial
discovery was originally conceived.
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The New Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Discovery:
Will Mandatory Cooperation in Discovery Curb Abuse?
Nancy J. Gegenheimer

Introduction
On April 22, 1993, the United States Supreme Court adopted changes to the
Federal .Rules of Civil Procedure, to take effect December 1, 1993 barring Congressional
intervention, that govern all proceedings in civil cases commenced thereafter and, to the
extent just and practicable, to all proceedings in civil cases then pending. This article
addresses whether the amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing
discovery are likely to remedy discovery abuses and, if so, whether the Colorado
Supreme Court should consider adopting similar changes.
The amendments preserve traditional forms of discovery including interrogatories,
depositions and document requests but substantially curtail a party's ability to use these
.devices. In place of traditional discovery devices, the amendments opt for unilateral
disclosure. Before any discovery request is served, each party is required to volun~arily
disclose to the other party four categories of information:
(1) Individuals with KDowledge: The name, address and telephone number of
individuals likely to ~ave discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings;
(2) Relevant Documents: Descriptions of documents, data compilations and tangible
things in the possession, custody or control of the party relevant to disputed facts alleged
with particularity in the pleadings;
(3) Damages: The computation of damages and production of documents relevant to
damages; and
(4) Insurance: Production of insurance agreements.
The problem created by this amendment is the language "facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings." Despite a growing trend toward verbose and lengthy
complaints, the rules still require only a short and plain statement of a claim. [See
Fed.RCiv.P. 8.] Generally, the rules require only fraud or mistake to be pled with'
particularity. [See Fed.R.Civ.P. 9.] While the drafters may have intended that parties
would be encouraged to.avoid making conclusory allegations if only facts alleged with
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particularitY would lead to disclosur~ of this information, many courts are critical of
lengthy complaints. [See Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409, 415· (9th .Cir. 1985)
(dismissal of complaint exceeding 70 pages that were confusing and conclusory).] Will the
amendments simply convert discovery disputes into disputes over what is "relevant" or
"pled with particularity"? Such disputes may be difficult to resolve without an
amendment to Rule 8.
.Under the amendments the parties are not allowed to engage in traditional
discovery, absent leave of the court, U!Itil they have conducted a face-to-face mandatory
discovery planning session under Rule 26(£). The parties must meet as soon as
practicable, but no later than 14 days before the scheduling conference required by
Rule 16(b) (meeting with the court required as soon as practicable, but in any event
within 120 days after the appearance of a defendant and within 90 days after the
complaint has been served on a defendant). The purpose of the Rule 26(£) meeting
requirement is to: (1) discuss the nature and basis of claims and defenses; (2) discuss the
po~sibility for prompt settlement or resolution; (3) arrange for the disc1osures discussed
above; and (4) develop a proposed discovery plan. The discovery plan shall include
identification·of subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed and whether discovery should be conducted in phases, or· be limited to or
focused on particular issues. After the parties have framed a mutually-agreed upon plan,
the court must hold a discovery conference and enter an order establishing a schedule
and limitations for the conduct of discovery.
In sum, cooperation among the parties is contemplated by the amendments as

welJ as more court participation in outlining discovery needs before the parties undertake
traditional discovery techniques. Once the court has approved the discovery plan,
however, traditional discovery devices may still be employed, although these devices have
been substantially curtailed by the amendments.

Interrogatories and Document Requests
No interrogatories or document requests may be served before the time specified
in Rule 26(d). Interrogatories are lhnited to 25 in number, including all discrete
subparts. Leave to serve additional interrogatories can be granted by the court to the
extent consistent with the principles of Rule 26(b)(2). As noted by Justice Lohr, prior to
the amendment, interrogatory abuses included voluminous form interrogatories that were
not adapted to a particular case, obj~ctions to interrogatories to create delay, and evasive
and nonresponsive answers. The amendment to Rule 33 used in conjunction with the
disclosures required by Rule 26 is designed to reduce the frequency and increase the
efficiency of interrogatories.
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Depositions
Justice Lohr also describes deposition abuses, which include taking multiple
depositions when a smaller number would be adequate. The amendments substantially
limit the number of depositions that can be taken absent leave of the court. Parties
must secure leave of the court to take more than 10 depositions in a case or to examine
a person more than once. No deposition can be taken before the time specified in
Rule 26(d) ~tbout leave of the court or a certification that the person examined is
expected to leave the United States or be unavailable for examination in this country.
Further deposition abuse includes unwarranted objections, unwarranted assertions
of privilege or coaching a witness. The local rules of practice for the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado specifically define abusive deposition conduct
and provide sanctions for abusive deposition conduct. [See D.C. Colo. LR 30.1C.]
Rules Governing Abuse and Sanctions
To discourage a party from attempting to conceal or suppress harmful evidence by
using an unfounded claim of privilege or work product, the federal rules have adopted an
approach taken several years ago by the Tenth Circuit. The amendments mandate that
when a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under a claim of privilege or
work-product, the evidence must be described without revealing information itself
privileged or protected, so as to enable another party to assess the applicability of the
privilege or protection. [See Rule 26(b)(5).] In 1984 the Tenth Circuit held that failure
to disclose documents withheld on the grounds of privilege resulted in a loss of the
privilege. [See .Peat, Marwick, Mitchell Co. v. West, 748 F. 2d 540 (lOth Cir. 1984).]
Suppression of documents or destruction of evidence relevant to an action should lead to
default or issue preclusion. [See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Adolph Coors Co. v. American Insurance Co., 1993 U.S.
Dist. Le:xis 3732 (Mar. 4, 1993); Wm. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp.,
593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455-46 (C.D. CaL 1984).]
Amended Rule 26(g)(3) permits the court to impose sanctions for violations of
Rule 26. Rule 11 no longer applies to discovery violations and it expressly provides that
it is not applicable to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections and
motions subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
Amendment 26(g) now incorporates in discovery requests and disdosures the
same certification that attorneys or parties give tinder Rule 11 for pleadings. The
signature of an attorney or a party as to the disclosed information required by
Amendment 26(a)(l) and on each discovery request, response or objection constitutes a
certification that, to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief, formed
after reasonable inquiry: (1) the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it was
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made; and (2) as to the discovery requests, (a) is consistent with the rules and warranted
by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law; (b) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (c) is not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation. Sanctions for a certification made in violation of the
rule, may include an order to pay reasonable expenses incurred in the violation,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
Further sanctions are included in the amendments to Rule 37. Under the
amendments, a party must certify all reasonable efforts to attempt in good faith to confer
with the other party to secure the information without court intervention. Similar .
requirements already exist in the local rules for the District of Colorado. [See D.C. Colo.
LR 7.1.] If a party fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a), that party shall
not be permitted to use the evidence at trial, at a hearing or on a motion: Sanctions for
failure to make discovery remain the same as they were prior to the amendments as set
out in Rule 37(b)(2)(A)-(E).
Conclusion
The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure already operate in a manner similar to the
federal amendments. The disclosure requirements of Amendment 26(a) as a practical
.
matter will operate similarly to C.R.C.P. 16, Colorado's disclosure certificate
requirements, effective September 1, 1990. With Colorado's requirements, parties must
disclose witnesses and documents to be used at trial. The risk of being precluded from
using evidence not included on a disclosure certificate or not disclosed under the federal
rules is strong incentive for all parties to make a good-faith effort to disclose.
C.R.C.P. 11 requires a certification which applies to discovery. The sanctions available
in Rule 37 remain the same at the state and federal level. No doubt mandatory
cooperation, added by the federal amendments, will help curb some discovery abuses.
However, the key to success of the federal amendments or any attempt to curb discovery
abuse is the imposition of severe sanctions at the trial level and upholding such sanctions
at the appellate level.
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